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In free society, a woman who experiences harassment may seek the protection
of police officers, friends, coworkers or relevant social service agencies. She
may also have the option of moving to locations where the harassment
would no longer occur. In sharp contrast, the safety of women prisoners is
entrusted to prison officials, some of whom harass women prisoners and
1
many of whom tolerate the harassment.

INTRODUCTION
There are few words that can describe the horrendous conditions
that all inmates face in the District of Columbia Correctional
Facilities.2 However, no possible description of the sexual abuse,
3
4
5
torture and rape, inadequate medical care, overcrowding, and
6
7
deplorable physical conditions faced each day by female inmates
1. Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dept of Corrections v. District of Columbia,
877 F. Supp. 634, 665 (D.D.C. 1994), revd in part and affd in part, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Women Prisoners I].
2. See Jonathan M. Smith, The District of Columbia Revitalization Act and Criminal
Justice: The Federal Governments Assault on Local Authority, 4 D.C. L. R EV. 77, 87 (1998)
[hereinafter Smith, Revitalization Act].
The conditions in which inmates are housed at the D.C. Jail constitute cruel
and unusual punishment . . . . These are conditions which turn men into
animals, conditions which degrade and dehumanize . . . . Imprisonment in
conditions such as these absolutely guarantees that the inmates will never be
able to return to civilized society, will never feel any stake in playing by its
rules.
Id. (citing Inmates of D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 416 F. Supp. 119, 122-23 (D.D.C. 1976)).
3. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 665 (describing the  [r]ape, coerced
sodomy, unsolicited touching of women prisoners vaginas, breasts and buttocks by
prison employees ).
4. See id. at 643-44 ( Women prisoners during intake are not given pelvic exams
or breast exams . . . . Defendants do not routinely test women prisoners at [the
Correctional Treatment Facility] for sexually transmitted diseases. ). The court also
noted that,  When [the Department of Corrections] transport[s] pregnant women
prisoners on medical visits they customarily place women in leg shackles, handcuffs
and a belly chain . . . . Id. at 646.
5. See Katya Lezin, Life at Lorton: An Examination of Prisoners Rights at the District of
Columbia Correctional Facilities, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 165, 170 (1996) ( The Districts
prison population has since [1993] risen to a vastly overcrowded 11,000 men and
women. ) (citing Courtland Milloy, Baring Their, Uh, Souls for Their Jailbirds, WASH .
POST, June 29, 1994, at B1); see also Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 100, 105
(D.D.C. 1975) ( By far the most flagrant and shocking encroachment on the
constitutional rights of the [prisoner] class is the overcrowding . . . . ), affd in part
and revd in part, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
6. Cf. Lezin, supra note 5, at 172 ( The vast majority of inmates . . . describe
their incarceration as intolerable . . . . ).
7. Though this Comment focuses on the female inmate population in the
District of Columbia, this Comment cannot ignore the depravation faced by male
inmates in the Districts prisons. See Lezin, supra note 5, for a discussion of the
conditions in which male inmates lived in the Lorton, Virginia complex prior to its
closing, and James E. Robertson, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the United States
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could come close to the actual conditions in which they live.
Likewise, no one Comment could possibly address all of the problems
9
within the Districts correctional facilities.
This Comment explores the crisis within the official structure of
the Department of Corrections and the judicial system that allows
guards to sexually harass and abuse female inmates in D.C.
10
By
Correctional Facilities seemingly without punishment.
examining failures within the legal system and the Department of
Corrections, this Comment brings to light the severe civil rights
violations that are occurring within the District of Columbia prison
11
system and the failure of the judicial system to adequately address
12
the problem.
Part I of this Comment discusses the history of poor conditions in
District of Columbia prisons as a whole, and specifically conditions
for the female inmates therein. The sections that follow provide an
analysis of the state of the law applicable to female inmates who are
sexually abused, and the remedies that are available to them through
both federal and District of Columbia law. Part II focuses on the
federal law available to female inmates and explores the rights they
are afforded under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution and

Prisons: Sexual Harassment Among Male Inmates, 36 A M. C RIM. L. R EV. 1 (1999).
8. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. 634, 663 (D.D.C. 1994), revd in part and
affd in part, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing the District of Columbia Prisons
as containing  a deprivation which amounts to a wanton and unnecessary infliction
of pain ).
9. Cf. Smith, Revitalization Act, supra note 2, at 86 (commenting on the poor
management, neglect, inefficient training of staff, violence, and other problems with
which the Districts prisons are plagued).
10. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 640 (explaining that the District has
 policies and procedures designed to address sexual misconduct, but these policies
are rarely used effectively); see also Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dept of Corrections
v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 930-31 (D.C. Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Women
Prisoners II] (noting that officials in the  [District of Columbia] have conceded that
they have failed to protect female inmates from sexual abuse, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment ); Newby v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 2d 35, 37 (D.D.C.
1999) ( The District has woefully failed to carry out its responsibilities [toward
female inmates] under both Federal law and the laws of the District of Columbia. ).
11. Female inmates are incarcerated in several facilities under the control of the
District. When referring to the  District of Columbia Prisons, I am referring to the
Minimum Security Annex in Lorton, Virginia ( Lorton ), the Correctional
Treatment Facility in the District ( C.T.F. ), and the Central Detention Facility or
D.C. Jail ( D.C. Jail ). See discussion infra, Part I.A. (describing the deplorable
conditions that exist in District of Columbia prisons). It is important to note that the
Lorton facility, was removed from District control in December 2001. See Michael D.
Shear, Homes Would Replace Lorton in Land Swap, WASH . POST, May 1, 2001, at B1
(discussing the proposed housing project that will be constructed at the site of the
Lorton prison upon its closing).
12. Cf. Lezin, supra note 5, at 200 ( The reality is that despite the Districts
efforts, these problems have persisted unabated for twenty years. ).
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Part II also addresses the high
standards set by the Supreme Court and the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, for prisoners who file claims against the government. Part III
discusses the applicable District of Columbia regulations and
Department of Corrections directives that female inmates who are
sexually abused should be able to rely upon to achieve justice. This
section also discusses the ways in which the courts have applied these
regulations and directives. The Comment concludes in Part IV with
the recommendation for criminal penalties for guards who sexually
abuse female inmates, and a rejection of the suggestion that
increasing the number of female guards will break the pattern of
sexual abuse in D.C. prisons.
I.

C ONDITIONS IN DISTRICT OF C OLUMBIA PRISONS: A H ISTORY OF
NEGLECT
A. Conditions for the General Population

Until very recently, the District of Columbia operated three
correctional facilities, two in the District, both of which are still
13
operational, and one in Lorton, Virginia. These facilities consist of
the Lorton Complex ( Lorton ), which is made up of several units
and closed in December 2001, the Central Detention Facility ( D.C.
14
Jail ) and the Correctional Treatment Facility ( C.T.F. ).
The
District has faced a series of problems with the conditions in the D.C.
15
Jail since the 1970s, and in Lorton and C.T.F. since the 1980s and
16
1990s respectively. Inmates have filed lawsuits against the District
17
regarding the conditions in its facilities for the past thirty years.
13. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting in particular that the
District is no longer in control of the Lorton, Virginia facility as of December 2001);
see also Lezin, supra note 5, at 167 (commenting that the District manages the Lorton,
Virginia Facility (until December 2001), the Central Detention Facility ( D.C. Jail ),
and the Correctional Treatment Facility ( C.T.F. )).
14. See supra text accompanying note 11 (discussing the three facilities operated
by the District).
15. See Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ( [T]he Jail
was not really fit for human habitation. ) (quoting then Director of the
Department of Corrections, Delbert Jackson). The circuit court in Campbell also
cited trial testimony describing the D.C. Jail as  beyond the tolerable level of human
existence. Id.
16. See Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(discussing the poor sanitation, housing, and other  environmental conditions in
the Virginia facilities which posed  serious health risks to prisoners); cf. Triplett v.
District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 1450, 1452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (evaluating prisoner
claims of a practice of excessive force in the District of Columbia prisons).
17. See discussion supra text accompanying note 12 (highlighting comments that
have been made in lawsuits by prisoners regarding the conditions in D.C. prisons).
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These lawsuits have alleged terrible conditions, such as poor
18
19
20
sanitation, vermin infestations, vast overcrowding, and sexual
21
abuse. Despite the numerous lawsuits highlighting these problems,
as of 1999 the District of Columbia had failed to resolve many of the
22
problems within it prisons.
Furthermore, in 1996, the facilities at Lorton suffered a severe food
shortage,23 and the security at the largest facility at Lorton was found
24
to suffer from  major shortcomings.
All of the District of
25
26
Columbia facilities have been vastly overcrowded and understaffed.
18. See Campbell, 580 F.2d at 535 (discussing the  serious infestations of rats, mice
and cockroaches, as well as general uncleanliness causing obnoxious odors that
existed at the D.C. Jail).
19. See id.
20. See id. at 537 (citing severe overpopulation in D.C. facilities as early as 1975);
Inmates of Occoquan, 844 F.2d at 842 (reviewing a District Court-ordered population
cap on District of Columbia prisons); Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 651 (noting
 population pressures led the District to house women prisoners in the Annex in
Lorton, Virginia).
21. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 634-43 (listing numerous allegations of
sexual assault, harassment, and abuse in the D.C. facilities); accord Daskalea v. District
of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 436 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (determining that the evidence
 established the routine sexual abuse of women inmates by prison guards at the
District of Columbia Jail ); Newby v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 2d 35, 37
(D.D.C. 1999) (describing, as  horrendous, several evenings of forced female
inmate stripping at the D.C. Jail).
22. Cf. Newby, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 37 (commenting that the District has failed to
institute monitoring procedures in the D.C. Jail despite past lawsuits and court
orders).
23. See Bruce D. Brown, Confronting the Cruel and the Unusual, Daily Troubled
Prisons Troubleshooter, LEGAL T IMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at 1 ( [A] severe food shortage at
the Lorton complex . . . left inmates underfed and angry. ).
24. See id.
25. See Inmates of Occoquan, 844 F.2d at 829 (restating findings of the District
Court that Occoquan was housing  excessive numbers of people in limited spaces ).
The court indicated further that several warehouses on-site had been  hastily
converted to dormitories to house excess prisoners. Id. at 830. Justice Greene also
noted in a dissent that the  original capacity of the institution was 1,366, but by
March of 1988 the inmate population had already risen by almost 700 to 2,051. Id.
at 844 (Greene, J., dissenting). Cf. News release, U.S. Dept of Justice, Bureau of
Statistics, Nations Prison and Jail Population Reaches 1,860,520, Could Reach Two
Million by Late 2001 [hereinafter Nations Prison and Jail Population] (Apr. 2000)
(on file with author) ( As of December 31, 1998 (the latest data available) state
prisons were operating at 13 to 22 percent over capacity, while federal prisons were
27 percent over capacity. ).
26. See Smith, Revitalization Act, supra note 2, at 86.
There has been, for the past several years, an extreme shortage of
correctional officers at the D.C. Jail. These shortages were identified as early
as 1994, and have continued [through] today. Over this time period, the
D.C. Jail has been operating with more than 100 guard vacancies. As many
as fifty additional guards are not available for duty on any given day because
of leave. When leave is taken into account more than 150 out of 612
positions are unfilled or are filled by overtime.
Id. at 95(internal citations omitted).
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The Districts correctional facilities have been described as
27
 violat[ing] contemporary standards of decency, and as being
28
 inhumane.
As a result of the offensive conditions in the D.C. prisons, the
District has been subject to numerous injunctions by local courts over
29
These injunctions have attempted to address the
the years.
30
inadequate living conditions in the D.C. prisons, but have failed to
31
solve any of the ongoing problems.
Both men and women inmates endure the horrible living
32
Female inmates in the
conditions in the District of Columbia.
District, however, are faced with the additional challenge of avoiding
33
sexual assault by prison guards.
B. Conditions for Female Inmates
34

Female inmates in the D.C. prison system are housed in several
27. Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. 634, 670 (D.D.C. 1994), revd in part and affd
in part, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
28. Id. at 671.
29. See Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 551-52 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (agreeing
with parts of the district courts order requiring the Department of Corrections
( D.O.C. ) to provide larger spaces for pretrial detainees, to limit the number of
inmates housed in the D.C. Jail, and to modify other administrative procedures of
the D.O.C.); see also Women Prisoners II, 93 F.3d 910, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (affirming
in part and vacating in part a 138-paragraph order by the district court instructing
the D.O.C. to make numerous modifications to its operation of the D.C. prisons);
Lezin, supra note 5, at 211 n.6 (noting that in 1996 the Maximum Security facility at
Lorton had a  court-ordered population cap of 645 prisoners ).
30. See discussion supra note 29.
31. See Newby v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 2d 35, 37 (D.D.C. 1999)
(noting the Districts failure to conform to both federal and District of Columbia law
and its failure to protect female inmates); Jonathan M. Smith, Reform at the End of a
Cattle Prod: Bringing Suit to Clean Up D.C. Prisons, LEGAL T IMES, Jan. 16, 1995, at 35
[hereinafter Smith, Reform].
Even those promises that are contained in consent decrees and backed by
court orders are routinely ignored by D.C. Officials. In virtually every prison
case in which an order has been entered requiring systemic reform, the D.C.
Department of Corrections has failed to comply with the terms of the order.
Id.
32. See Lezin, supra note 5, at 167-72 (describing the conditions in the facility at
Lorton, Virginia).
33. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 664 (highlighting instances of severe
sexual abuse of female inmates by correctional officers); Newby, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 35
(discussing the  strip-shows and exotic dancing that female inmates were forced to
participate in during the summer of 1995). Accord Daskalea v. District of Columbia,
227 F.3d 433, 439, 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (ruling in favor of an inmate who was forced
to participate in the same  strip-show as the plaintiff in Newby).
34. The U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Statistics maintains that women
represent six and one half percent of all state and federal prisoners. See Nations
Prison and Jail Population, supra note 25. The Justice Department estimates that
approximately 150,000 women were behind bars in June of 1999, 81,100 of those in
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areas within the correctional facilities operated by the District. The
overwhelming majority of female offenders are housed in medium
36
37
security units and are serving time for non-violent offenses;
moreover, almost one-half of the female prisoners in the District are
38
serving time for drug-related offenses. These women are generally
serving less than twenty-four months and are housed as part of the
39
general female population.
Although the conditions of
40
confinement are horrible for female inmates in the District, none of
the poor conditions that women suffer compare to living each day in
41
fear of sexual assault by correctional officers. In 1993, in an attempt
to change these conditions, a group of female prisoners in D.C.
correctional facilities filed a class action lawsuit against the District of
prison and 68,100 in local jails. See id.
35. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 639. Female inmates at Lorton were
housed in a collection of minimum-security dormitories called the Annex. See id. In
1994, the Annex housed  174 women prisoners who [were] either held for trial,
awaiting sentence or within 24 months of release. Id. at 638. The C.T.F. in the
District of Columbia housed approximately 271 female inmates out of the 800 beds
available in 1994. See id. at 639. These female inmates are medium security prisoners
and are in the general population at C.T.F. See id. The D.C. Jail ranges from
medium to maximum security and housed approximately 168 female prisoners in
1994  who [were] either serving sentences of less than one year or who [were]
awaiting trial or sentencing. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 639; see also 1999
GAO R EP., Women in Prison: Sexual Misconduct by Correctional Staff 1 [hereinafter
Women in Prison] ( [F]emale offenders held by the District of Columbia . . . totaled
about 320 at year-end 1998. ).
36. See supra text accompanying note 35 (citing the number of female prisoners
in D.C. facilities).
37. See Smith, Revitalization Act, supra note 2, at 91 ( Only 15% of women [in the
District] are incarcerated for violent crime compared to 50.3% of the total prison
population. ).
38. See id. ( 46.6% of all District women prisoners are incarcerated for drug
sale. ).
39. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 639 (noting that women in the Lorton
complex are within twenty-four months of release and women at the D.C. Jail are
within one year of release).
40. See id. at 648-53 (describing the poor conditions in the female housing units).
Among other things, the court cited: inability to generate sufficient heat, defective
toilets, problems with rodents, inadequate food preparation, poor air quality due to
lack of mechanical ventilation, cockroaches and lice, and the carrying of clean and
dirty laundry in the same cart. See id. But see Rita J. Simon, Women in Prison, in
FEMALE C RIMINALITY: T HE STATE OF THE A RT 375, 392 (Concetta C. Culliver ed., 1993)
(arguing womens prisons generally have better conditions than mens prisons).
Women usually have more privacy than men; they tend to have single rooms;
they may wear street clothes rather than prison uniforms; they may decorate
their rooms with bedspreads and curtains provided by the prison. Toilet and
shower facilities also reflect a greater concern for womens privacy.
Id.
41. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 665 ( The evidence revealed a level of
sexual harassment which is so malicious that it violates contemporary standards of
decency. ).
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Columbia in federal district court, seeking injunctive relief for a
43
number of inhumane conditions in the D.C. prisons, including
44
sexual harassment and abuse by prison staff.
In Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections
45
v. District of Columbia (Women Prisoners I), the class of female
inmates complained of sexual assault, rape, poor medical facilities,
poor housing conditions, and inadequate programs in all three D.C.
46
facilities. After discussing the conditions that existed in the three
47
D.C. facilities, and finding numerous Eighth Amendment violations,
the district court issued a lengthy order articulating the steps to be
48
taken by the District to improve conditions.
This court order,
however, was largely vacated by the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
49
Circuit in 1996.
In 1999, other female inmates brought suit against the District of
50
51
Columbia for sexual harassment. In Newby v. District of Columbia
42. See id. at 638 (explaining that the class was certified to include all female
inmates in the District as of October, 1993).
43. See id. at 638. The class in Women Prisoners I sought injunctive relief on the
grounds that the conditions in the Districts prisons violated their constitutional
rights. See id. Aside from sexual harassment, the women cited poor obstetrical and
gynecological care, poor housing conditions, inadequate fire safety, and unequal
educational, recreational, religious and work programs, as grounds for injunctive
relief. See id.
44. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 639 ( The level of harassment
involv[ed] forceful sexual activity, unsolicited sexual touching, exposure of body
parts or genitals and sexual comments. ).
45. 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994), revd in part and affd in part, 93 F.3d 910
(D.C. Cir. 1996).
46. See id. at 639. The women argued the need for
relief on the following grounds: 1) . . . sexual harassment in violation of the
Fifth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment; 2) . . . unequal opportunities
to participate in prison programs in comparison to similarly situated men at
other correctional facilities in violation of Title IX and the Fifth
Amendment; 3) . . . inadequate obstetrical and gynecological care . . .; and
4) the general conditions of confinement and fire hazards . . . violate the
Eighth Amendment.
Id.
47. See id. at 665. The district court found that the female inmates had
demonstrated  a level of sexual harassment which is so malicious that it violates
contemporary standards of decency. Id. The court also found Eighth Amendment
violations regarding the treatment of pregnant women, fire safety, and the general
living conditions in the three facilities. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 665-74.
48. The court-ordered injunction consisted of a 138-paragraph decision
outlining the actions that the District needed to take to remedy the Eighth
Amendment violations. See id. at 679-90.
49. See Women Prisoners II, 93 F.3d 910, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (vacating all or parts
of eighty paragraphs of the 138-paragraph order).
50. See, e.g., Newby v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 1999);
Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
51. 59 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 1999).
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52

and Daskalea v. District of Columbia, the female plaintiffs exposed
episodes of forced nude dancing and a pattern of sexual assaults by
53
correctional officers in the D.C. Jail. Correctional officers forced
both Newby and Daskalea to perform lewd acts and dance nude in
front of their cellblock population in the D.C. Jail on several
54
occasions in July 1995.
The courts in both cases noted the
55
outrageous conduct of the officers involved, and the circuit court in
Daskalea held that there were blatant Eighth Amendment violations
56
on the part of the District.
All three of these lawsuits alleged misconduct on the part of prison
57
guards ranging from forced exotic dancing and unsolicited
58
59
60
fondling, to rape and forced sodomy.
The lawsuits also
61
implicated the District in a pattern of inadequate responses to
52. 227 F.3d 433 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
53. See Newby, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 35-36 (stating that male guards in the D.C. Jail
forced female inmates to perform strip shows and sexual acts for them); Daskalea,
227 F.3d at 437 (describing the dancing that occurred in front of over one hundred
 chanting, jeering guards and inmates ).
54. See Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 442-43 (relating there were  multiple nude dancing
incidents and fourteen guards were eventually implicated in the sexual
misconduct).
55. See Newby, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 36-37 (noting that no supervisory steps were taken
to prevent sexual abuse of women after the Women Prisoners I decision was issued in
1994); Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 438 (describing an acceptance of sexual encounters
between correctional staff and inmates at the D.C. Jail).
56. See Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 441 ( We conclude that the jury had more than
sufficient evidence upon which to base its finding of deliberate indifference. ).
57. See Newby, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 35-36 ( The female prisoners . . . wore only gstrings during the dancing and at least on one occasion danced in the nude. On
each of the three dancing occasions the three prison guards on duty directed that
the dancing take place. ).
58. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 640 ( [A] correctional officer at C.T.F.
grabbed Jane Doe Ws buttocks and vagina while he escorted her from the medical
unit . . . . [while] different officers fondled women prisoners breasts, legs, arms and
buttocks. ) (internal citations omitted), revd in part and affd in part, 93 F.3d 910
(D.C. Cir. 1996).
59. See id. at 639 ( [A] correctional officer at the Jail, sexually assaulted Jane Doe
Q while she was a patient in the infirmary. The officer fondled her breasts and
vagina, tried to force her to perform oral sex and then raped her. ) (internal
citations omitted).
60. See id. (commenting the rape and forced sodomy of female inmates).
61. The District of Columbia is not alone in its failure to eradicate sexual abuse
by correctional officers. See Ashley E. Day, Cruel and Unusual Punishment of Female
Inmates: The Need for Redress Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 SANTA C LARA L. R EV. 555, 556
(1998) ( As recently as 1996, three female inmates brought suit against federal
prison authorities, alleging that some of the male guards were selling female
inmates to male inmates . . . . ); Anny Kuo, Plan to Ban Male Guards Sparks Debate,
T IMES UNION (Albany, New York), Jan. 31, 2000, at B2 (discussing responses to the
recent arrest of guards for sexual misconduct); see also News Release, U.S. Dept of
Justice, Justice Department Sues Arizona Over Conditions at Womens Prisons
(1997) (describing lawsuits filed against the states of Arizona and Michigan seeking
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63

female complaints. Despite the lengthy court order issued by the
64
district court in Women Prisoners I, however, the District had failed to
65
curb sexual misconduct against female inmates by 1995. Even by
the time Newby reached the district court in 1999, the court noted
that the District still had failed to improve monitoring conditions for
66
female inmates.
When the incidents of sexual abuse and harassment of female
inmates are brought forward, it may be difficult to believe that
67
women incarcerated in the District face these conditions of
confinement everyday. Yet, however difficult it may be to believe, the
to protect female inmates from  rapes, sexual assaults, and other improper sexual
contact by staff ).
62. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 640 ( [The] various policies and
procedures [regarding sexual harassment] are of little value because the Defendants
address the problem of sexual harassment of women prisoners with no specific staff
training, inconsistent reporting practices, cursory investigations and timid
sanctions. ) (citations omitted); see also Newby, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 37 (noting that the
 sexual dancing took place in front of an entire cell block in the D.C. Jail, but the
incident only surfaced when the victims themselves came forward); Women Prisoners
II, 93 F.3d at 931 (discussing portions of the court order imposed by the district
court and indicating,  [it] does not impose any new burdens on [the District]; it
simply requires [the District] to observe [its] own policies and procedures in the
running of [its] prisons ).
63. See Women Prisoners II, 93 F.3d at 933 app. A (attaching the original court
order, which was 138 paragraphs long).
64. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated all or
parts of 80 of the 138-paragraph order. See Women Prisoners II, 93 F.3d at 932.
65. See Newby v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 2d 35, 36 (D.D.C. 1999)
(noting that, despite the fact that the district court opinion was handed down seven
months before Ms. Newbys incident, the District had done little to ensure that
guards were not taking advantage of female inmates); see also Brown, supra note 23, at
1 (discussing a July, 1995 report on inadequate medical and mental health services in
the D.C. Jail).
66. See Newby, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 37.
Even to this date the District of Columbia has taken no steps to monitor what
occurs in the jail, either by the placement of surveillance cameras or
directing supervisory officials to be present with prison guards during their
daily prison rounds . . . . With the Citys past history of sexual misconduct at
the jail, it is incumbent upon the city to find some way to monitor the
common areas at the jail.
Id.
67. For additional information about sexual abuse by male prison guards in
prisons around the United States, other than the District of Columbia, see Cheryl Bell
et al., Rape and Sexual Misconduct in the Prison System: Analyzing Americas Most Open
Secret, 18 YALE L. & POLY R EV. 195, 196 (1999) for a discussion of sexual abuse of
female inmates in prisons around America including New Mexico, South Dakota,
Delaware, and Texas. See also The Role of the Department of Justice in Implementing the
Prison Reform Act, as Contained in Public Law 104-134 (Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions
and Appropriations Act of 1996): Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 6364 (1996) (statement of Mark I. Soler, President, Youth Law Center) [hereinafter
Prisoners Rights Legislation] (discussing sexual relations between prisoners and guards
in the Georgia Womens Correctional Institution).
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truth remains that despite the many state and federal laws that exist
68
to protect prisoners, female inmates in the District continue to be
69
sexually brutalized.
II. FEDERAL R EMEDIES FOR FEMALE INMATES: H IGH STANDARDS,
DISAPPOINTING R ESULTS
[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds [her] there
against [her] will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to
70
assume some responsibility for [her] safety and general well-being.

A. The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that
the government shall not inflict  cruel and unusual punishments on
71
its citizens. Inmates generally can file for civil redress for violations
72
of the Eighth Amendment through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This statute
provides inmates with a civil remedy for violations of their
73
constitutional rights by state actors, mainly correctional officials.
However, in order to obtain redress under section 1983, inmates
must meet all of the requirements the Supreme Court has outlined
74
These
for prisoners claiming Eighth Amendment violations.
68. See discussion infra Parts II and III (analyzing remedies available to sexually
abused inmates through the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1994), and the local regulations of the District of Columbia and the
Department of Corrections).
69. See Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and Wrongs in Our Own Backyard:
Incorporating International Human Rights Protections Under Domestic Civil Rights Law  A
Case Study of Women in the United States Prisons, 13 H ARV. H UM. R TS. J. 71, 74 (2000)
( Within prison populations, increasing numbers of womens lives are reduced to
half-lives under the tortuous effects of sexual abuse by corrections officials. ); see also
Robertson, supra note 7, at 51 n.3 ( Sexual harassment of female inmates by male
prison staff has a long, documented history in American penology. ).
70. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200
(1989).
71. U.S. C ONST. amend. VIII.
72. See Day, supra note 61, at 557 ( The main legal channel for female prisoners
who file a cause of action alleging abuse by male prison guards is under 42 U.S.C. §
1893 . . . . ).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
74. See Day, supra note 61, at 585 (noting that obtaining injunctive relief for
sexually abused female inmates is still very difficult because of the requirements of
Eighth Amendment claims).
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requirements are numerous and in most cases difficult for inmates to
75
meet.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to
76
77
require that a punishment be both cruel and unusual to qualify as
78
an Eighth Amendment violation. For inmates this means that a
punishment or condition of confinement that is cruel, but not
particularly unusual, may not meet the standard required for relief
79
under the Eighth Amendment.
Generally, this prong of Eighth
Amendment scrutiny protects prison officials from suit for conditions
that result from uncontrollable circumstances  for example,
80
equipment malfunctions and extreme weather conditions.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has derived a number of
81
preconditions that must be met before a condition of confinement,
or an act by a prison official, can be found to violate the Eighth
82
Amendment. In 1976, the Supreme Court held that a prison official
75. See id. at 557 (arguing that the additional defense of  qualified immunity
makes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims even more difficult for female inmates to win).
Although, qualified immunity is indeed a significant obstacle for female inmates, its
breadth is beyond the scope of this Comment. For additional critiques of qualified
immunity and its application toward female inmates, see Day, supra note 61, at 557.
76. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 967 (1991) ( [A] disproportionate
punishment can perhaps always be considered cruel, but it will not always be . . .
unusual. ).
77. See id. at 976 (indicating that the word  unusual meant at the time of the
writing of the Constitution, and still means today, something which does not
 occu[r] in ordinary practice ) (citing WEBSTERS A MERICAN DICTIONARY (1828)).
78. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 976 ( According to its terms, then, by forbidding
cruel and unusual punishments, the Clause disables the Legislature from
authorizing particular forms or modes of punishment specifically, cruel methods
of punishment that are not regularly or customarily employed. ) (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original); see also Greer, supra note 69, at 96 (commenting that Harmelin
establishes a two-prong test that requires punishments to be both cruel and unusual
to fall under the protection of the Eighth Amendment).
79. The Court has noted a condition of confinement that is not purposely
inflicted on a prisoner, but may be particularly cruel and lead to harm, still may not
qualify for Eighth Amendment redress. See generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
299-300 (1991) (discussing the confines of cruel and unusual according to the
Eighth Amendment).
80. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300 (noting that if the boiler breaks down in a very
cold winter a prisoner has no basis for a claim, even if he suffers  significant harm ).
81. The Supreme Court has recognized that the conditions of confinement for
prisoners, beyond those directly inflicted by prison officials, can also qualify as cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (finding that a prison official must know and disregard  an
excessive risk to inmate health to be liable for an Eighth Amendment violation);
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 350 (1981) (holding that the  double-celling of
inmates was not a condition of confinement that violated the Eighth Amendment);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (determining that inadequate medical
care qualifies as a violation of the Eighth Amendment if prison officials act with
 deliberate indifference towards an inmates needs).
82. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (discussing the actions that a prison official must
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must demonstrate  deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm to an inmate in order to violate the Eighth
83
Since then, the  deliberate indifference test has
Amendment.
been the foundation for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and has
been reinterpreted and amended by the Court several times since its
84
inception.
85
For example, in 1991, in Wilson v. Seiter, the Supreme Court held
that an inmate claiming an Eighth Amendment violation must
demonstrate that the offending officer was acting with the intent to
86
inflict cruel and unusual punishment upon the inmate. Previously,
the Court had also held that the officials act must be one which
 deprive[s] inmates of the minimal civilized measure of lifes
87
necessities to be an Eighth Amendment violation. These and other
holdings added to the deliberate indifference test and made its
interpretation confusing for the circuit courts throughout the 1980s
88
and early 1990s.
In addition, the standards set by the Supreme Court have been
89
highly subjective and difficult for the complaining inmate to meet,
90
even when the prisoner shows clear signs of physical injury. The
subjective  intent prong of the Wilson decision requires that the
state of mind of the alleged offending prison officer be investigated

take in order to be liable); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (holding
 significant injury is not required for a prisoner to recover for an Eighth
Amendment violation); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991) (clarifying that
Eighth Amendment cases  mandate inquiry into a prison officials state of mind ).
83. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828 (referring to the deliberate indifference test
articulated in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)) (citations omitted).
84. Cf. id. at 835-36 (discussing the many tests articulated under the Eighth
Amendment and relating past jurisprudence regarding  deliberate indifference ).
85
501 U.S. 294 (1991).
86. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300 ( If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as
punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be
attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify [as an Eighth Amendment
violation]. ) (emphasis in original).
87. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
88. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836 (noting that circuit courts have attempted to
equate deliberate indifference with recklessness, but have had difficulty determining
what level of intent the test requires).
89. Compare McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 349 (7th Cir. 1991) ( A prisoner
normally proves actual knowledge of impending harm by showing that he
complained to prison officials about a specific threat to his safety. ), with Robertson,
supra note 7, at 39 (explaining prisoners often do not come forward about sexual
misconduct).
90. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326 (1986) (holding an inmate shot
during a prison uprising did not meet the Eighth Amendment standard because the
guard applied the force  in a good faith effort to quell prisoners).
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before an Eighth Amendment violation can be found. This inquiry
leaves administrative investigators and courts few objective signs to
look for when investigating an Eighth Amendment violation by a
92
prison guard.
The difficult standards set by the Court can be explained by its
93
reluctance to involve itself in the operation of correctional facilities
94
or to scrutinize the actions of prison officials. Although the Court
has repeatedly attempted to articulate a bright line test for Eighth
95
Amendment claims, it has only continued to create subjective
guidelines in an attempt to remove itself from the process of prison
96
administration. An example of the Courts reluctance to become
involved in correctional operations is its most recent attempt to
outline a strict definition for the deliberate indifference test in Farmer
97
v. Brennan.
1.

The Farmer v. Brennan Standard
In 1994 the Supreme Court established a new test for cruel and

91. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 299.
92. See David M. Siegal, Rape in Prison and AIDS, 44 STAN. L. R EV. 1541, 1556
(1992) (noting that the Wilson decision may raise an  insurmountable barrier to
some claims which allege conduct that should be deemed cruel and unusual. ).
93. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 (1981) (opining that the judiciary
should be cautious in its approach to prison litigation).
This Court must proceed cautiously in making an Eighth Amendment
judgment . . . . In assessing claims that conditions of confinement are cruel
and unusual, courts must bear in mind that their inquiries  spring from
constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect
that fact rather than a courts idea of how best to operate a detention
facility.
Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979)).
94. Cf. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (stating that inquiries into
measures taken by prison officials must determine whether the  force was applied in
a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline ).
95. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (rejecting the  significant injury test for Eighth
Amendment claims, but noting that de minimus injuries would not suffice to meet the
Eight Amendment standards); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 299 (mandating an inquiry into the
correctional officers state of mind to determine whether the Eighth Amendment has
been violated); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 (discussing that conditions must violate
 contemporary standards of decency to be cruel and unusual); Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that applying  deliberate indifference to medical
needs is a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
96. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352 (indicating the judiciary  cannot assume that state
legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the
Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how best to achieve the
goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system ).
97. 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (defining  deliberate indifference with a
subjective test, which analyzes prison officials knowledge of excessive risk to an
inmates health or safety relative to the conduct of the accused official).
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Farmer v.
unusual punishment inflicted by correctional officers.
99
Brennan involved a transsexual male inmate who had undergone
100
hormone treatments to become female. Although guards knew of
101
Farmers characteristics, they placed him in the general population
102
where, within two weeks, he was raped and beaten by other inmates.
After reviewing the large amount of precedent in the area of the
Eighth Amendment,103 the Court outlined a new standard104 to be
used when determining the liability of prison officials under the
105
 deliberate indifference test. The Farmer Court held that a prison
official  cannot be found liable unless the official knows of and
106
The Court
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.
further elaborated that this subjective test could be met if the prison
official  failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of
107
serious harm [to the inmate].
Although this test may be seen as
an attempt to clarify the requirements of an Eighth Amendment
claim for the circuit courts, in the area of prison rape and sexual
abuse, the Farmer test is often difficult to meet and remains a highly
108
subjective analysis of an inmates injuries.
98. See id. at 835 (commenting that until Farmer, the Supreme Court had never
explained the meaning of  deliberate indifference directly).
99. See id. at 828 (noting that Farmer had been diagnosed as a transsexual by the
Bureau of Prisons).
100. See id. at 829 ( [P]etitioner[,] who is biologically male, wore womens
clothing . . . , underwent estrogen therapy, received silicone breast implants, and
submitted to unsuccessful black market testicle-removal surgery. ) (internal citation
omitted).
101. See id. at 831 (discussing the allegation that  despite knowledge that the
penitentiary had a violent environment and a history of inmate assaults, and despite
knowledge that [Farmer], as a transsexual who projects feminine characteristics,
would be particularly vulnerable to sexual attack, correctional officers placed
Farmer in the general population of male offenders).
102. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 830 (discussing the fact that Farmer was attacked by an
inmate in his own cell).
103. See id. at 834-38 (explaining that the Court has held in the past that the
 deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, . . . must result in the
denial of the minimal civilized measure of lifes necessities . . . . [and] pos[e] a
substantial risk of serious harm ) (internal citations omitted).
104. See id. at 842 (noting that the Court is adopting a subjective test that inquires
into a prison officials state of mind when acting towards an inmate).
105. See id. at 835-36 (finding that the  deliberate indifference test, first
introduced in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), had been treated differently by
the circuit courts). The circuit courts, according to the Court, had never answered
 the pending question about the level of culpability deliberate indifference entails.
Id.
106. Id. at 837.
107. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
108. See Bell et al., supra note 67, at 212 (noting the difficulty of proving that
officials knew of the risk of harm to the inmate and then failed to act to prevent that
harm).
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Applying the Farmer Standard to Sexual Abuse

The test outlined in Farmer still requires that there be a  substantial
risk of serious harm to an inmate in order for an Eighth
109
Amendment violation to be proven.
For female inmates suffering
at the hands of guards, it is often difficult to demonstrate that
110
officials knew about the risk of serious harm prior to the abuse. For
example, it has been argued that one incident of rape or sexual abuse
by a correctional officer does not meet the knowledge requirement of
111
Farmer.
Given the difficulty in imputing knowledge of a sexually abusive
environment to prison officials, federal courts have narrowly
construed the Supreme Courts ruling in Farmer.112 An example of
113
such narrow construction can be found in Carrigan v. State, where
114
the rape of a female inmate by a guard did not meet the Farmer
requirements, even though an official was aware of prior sexual
115
harassment in the prison. The district court determined that there
could be no deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials in
Carrigan because this was the  first rape that the plaintiff had
116
brought to the attention of officials.
117
Similarly, in Barney v. Pulsipher, two female inmates being held for
forty-eight hours in a county jail were unable to succeed with an
Eighth Amendment claim under the Farmer test for the sexual assaults
118
In Barney, the Tenth
they suffered at the hands of their jailer.
109. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 ( The official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference. ).
110. See Bell et al., supra note 67, at 212 ( For victims of rape or sexual misconduct
by prison guards, the difficulty lies in proving that prison administrators were aware
of the risk and ignored it. ).
111. See id. at 213 (noting that courts have refused to hold prison officials liable
for the  first rape because there could be no  deliberate indifference to an act
that they had no reason to know would occur) (citing Carrigan v. State, 957 F. Supp.
1376, 1382 (D. Del. 1997)).
112. See Day, supra note 61, at 577-80 (commenting on the difficulties female
inmates have had in proving the prongs of the Farmer test to the federal courts).
113. 957 F. Supp. 1376 (D. Del. 1997).
114. See id. at 1380 (relating that the female prisoner was raped in her cell by an
officer who then  tossed the condom on the bed, told [her] to dispose of it and
returned to his duties ).
115. See id. at 1382 (holding evidence of only a few prior incidents of misconduct
were insufficient to establish deliberate indifference under Farmer).
116. See id.
117. 143 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998).
118. See id. at 1304 (stating the jailer threatened to hold the inmate for longer
than her forty-eight hour sentence if she did not perform oral sex on him).
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Circuit ruled that there was no deliberate indifference on the part of
jail officials because they had no notice of prior sexual misconduct on
119
the part of the jailer involved in the assaults. The court made this
determination even though the jail violated its own policy requiring
two jailers to be on duty at all times when female inmates were
120
removed from their cells. It was the jails failure to adhere to this
policy, which allowed the jailer in Barney to work alone and to have
121
the opportunity to sexually assault the female victims.
These cases demonstrate that some federal courts have interpreted
the Farmer test to require that correctional officials have prior
knowledge of the specific harm to the inmate and the individual
officers prior conduct before allowing an Eighth Amendment
claim.122 Both Carrigan and Barney indicate that it is not enough for
officials to put inmates in situations involving possible sexual assault;
there must be definite evidence that there was a risk of serious harm
123
to prove deliberate indifference. For female inmates victimized by
sexual assaults, it is difficult to  fall within the narrow range of
124
circumstances justifying a finding of deliberate indifference.
3.

Meeting the Farmer Standard in the District of Columbia

The District of Columbia cannot make the argument that it is
unaware of the sexual assaults that occur inside its prisons. In 1993,
Women Prisoners I was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia alleging severe sexual abuse in all three of the Districts
correctional facilities.125 The filing of this case, and the allegations of
126
repeated sexual misconduct alone, should have put the District on
119. See id. at 1311 (holding that without any prior  evidence of sexual
misconduct on the part of the jailer involved, jail officials could not act with
deliberate indifference).
120. See id. (noting the existence of a policy requiring two guards to be with
female inmates when they are out of their cells, does not establish that there was a
risk of sexual assault at the jail).
121. Contra id. (stating the mere existence of a policy requiring two jailers to be
present when female inmates were removed from their cells  does not establish an
obvious risk that females left alone with male guards are likely to be assaulted ).
122. See Barney, 143 F.3d at 1311.
123. An example of this can be found in Barney, when the facility openly operated
without the required amount of staff, and was doing so when the sexual assault
occurred. See Barney, 143 F.3d at 1304 (citing  understaffing and budgetary
constraints as the reason the required number of jailers may not be on duty at any
given time).
124. See id. at 1308.
125. See generally Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994), affd in part and
revd in part, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
126. See discussion supra Part I (describing existing conditions at the D.C. Jail and
other correctional facilities that house women in the District of Columbia).
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notice of the conditions of sexual abuse in its prisons. However, in
128
129
1999 and August 2000, the federal district and appellate courts in
the District noted that the District had done little to improve
130
conditions.
In August 2000, the circuit court in Daskalea v. District of Columbia
discussed in detail the acts of sexual harassment that were occurring
131
in the D.C. Jail. The trial testimony discussed by the court revealed
 a culture of routine acceptance of sexual encounters between staff
132
and inmates. The court concluded that the  open and notorious
133
manner in which the female inmates were harassed and the
 repeated sexual abuse and harassment of women prisoners by D.C.
correctional officers was more than enough to find deliberate
134
indifference on the part of the District.
The holding of Daskalea is a victory for female inmates in D.C.
135
Given that Daskalea was
prisons, but it is not the end of the war.
forced to participate in nude dancing with other female inmates in
127. See Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
This is not the first time the federal courts have reviewed charges of sexual
abuse by D.C. correctional officers against female inmates. In 1993, a class
action was filed on behalf of all women prisoners under the care of the
District of Columbia correctional system . . . . The court . . . found that the
inmates had filed complaints and written letters to prison administrators to
no avail, and that the harassment was obvious and widely known.
Id.
128. See Newby v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 2d 35, 37 (D.D.C. 1999)
(noting that even as of July 1995, the District had not begun to monitor the activities
at the D.C. Jail).
129. See Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 442 (citing testimony at trial by the Director of D.C.
Department of Corrections indicating she was  unaware of the multiple nude
dancing incidents . . . and she took no action to protect [inmates] ).
130. See id. (concluding that there was direct evidence to show the District was
 indifferent to the plight of women in Jail ).
131. Id. at 438-39.
One cell, known as Cell 73, was kept empty and used for sex between
prisoners and guards. . . . Officer Walker, the head guard on the evening
shift, organized a series of evenings during which female inmates stripped
and danced provocatively to loud music. Both female and male guards were
present and, according to the testimony at trial, some guards assaulted
inmates who refused to dance.
Id.
132. Id. at 438.
133. Id. at 442.
134. See Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 441 ( Given this history, the District and its
policymakers were on notice that D.C. guards lacked basic respect for the rights of
female inmates, and that absent substantial intervention, the pattern of
unconstitutional behavior would persist. ).
135. See Women in Prison, supra note 35, at 2 (stating there were 111 reported
alleged misconduct incidents in the D.C. Department of Corrections from December
1995 through June 1998).
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136

front of an entire cellblock, it was almost impossible for the circuit
court to affirm anything other than deliberate indifference. Daskalea
137
involved a series of stark public abuses, however, there are many
female inmates who are raped or sexually abused by guards outside
138
The Eighth Amendment and the
the view of an entire cellblock.
139
Farmer test seem to do little to protect these women and given the
acts that took place in Daskalea and Newby, the actions of the courts
140
have done little to deter sexual abuse in the D.C. Prisons.
B. Prison Litigation Reform Act: The Physical Injury Requirement
In 1996 Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act
141
( PLRA ), in an attempt to respond to the explosion of prison
142
litigation in the last few decades.
Among the changes to prison
litigation made by the PLRA, section 803(d) provides that  no
Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical
143
injury.
For female inmates who are sexually harassed or even raped, it is
already difficult to come forward and demonstrate that they have

136. See Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 439 (pointing out that by the time that Daskalea was
dragged to the stripping area from her cell by other inmates,  all of the inmates,
numerous female guards, and several male guards and maintenance workers were in
attendance ).
137. See id. at 436-37. The acts in Daskalea took place in a cellblock with over one
hundred inmates and guards present. Id.
138. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. 634, 639-40 (D.D.C. 1994) (discussing
assaults on female inmates in the infirmary, in the television room, in the print shop,
and other areas of the prison outside the view of other officers and inmates), affd in
part and revd in part, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 438
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (describing a cell reserved for sexual encounters between staff and
inmates).
139. Cf. Bell, supra note 67, at 212 (noting that the federal courts have  severely
limited the liability of prison officials for permitting sexual misconduct within their
correctional facilities ).
140. See Women in Prison, supra note 35, at 2 (citing over one hundred reports of
staff on inmate sexual misconduct in the three years between 1995 and 1998).
141. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110
Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
142. See Stacey Heather OBryan, Closing the Courthouse Door: The Impact of the Prison
Litigation Reform Acts Physical Injury Requirement on the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners,
83 VA. L. R EV. 1189, 1189 (1997) (noting that the purpose of the Act was to respond
to the number of  frivolous lawsuits filed each year).
143. Prison Litigation Reform Act § 803(e). This section amends the Civil Rights
of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1994), to deny prisoners
the right to claim mental and emotional distress). See OBryan, supra note 142, at
1192-93.
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been sexually abused and the physical injury requirement of the
145
PLRA makes it even more difficult. Women who are forced to live
with continual abuse and  male corrections officers and staff . . .
[that are] engaged in regular verbal degradation and harassment of
146
female prisoners
suffer extreme mental and emotional
147
consequences. Female inmates who have been physically raped or
sodomized may be able to meet the physical injury requirement, but
the PLRA seems to deny claims for those women who suffer the
148
emotional consequences of being sexually harassed in prison.
As the district court in Women Prisoners I indicated, there are many
severe emotional results for women who are sexually harassed or
149
The court noted that women experience  irritability,
abused.
150
anxiety, and nervousness as a result of being sexually harassed.
They also become  fearful that they will be continually exposed to
[harassment] . . . . [and] lose confidence in the system when their
151
The psychological effects on women
reports go uninvestigated.
152
sexually abused in prison are real. The emotional turmoil that they
144. See Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 438. Daskalea filed over fifteen Internal Grievance
Procedure forms with D.C. Jail officials, and wrote to the Deputy Warden, the
Warden and the Director of the Department of Corrections; however, nothing was
done to help her while she was in prison. See id.
145. See Rahul Patel & Ann N. Sagerson, Procedural Means of Enforcement Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 89 GEO . L.J. 1938, 1946 (2001) ( [T]he Prison Litigation Reform
Act . . . significantly constrains available relief and imposes procedural barriers for
prisoners bringing suits challenging prison conditions. ); see also OBryan, supra note
142, at 1208-10 (discussing the sexually harassing circumstances which occur in
prisons where no actual physical injury is inflicted).
146. Human Rights Watch, Nowhere to Hide: Retaliation Against Women in Michigan
State Prisons, at 3 (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/women
[hereinafter Nowhere to Hide].
147. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. 634, 642-43 (D.D.C. 1994) (observing the
many mental and subsequent physical effects on women who have been sexually
harassed), revd in part and affd in part, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
148. See Patel & Sagerson, supra note 145, at 1943 (noting that the PLRA restricts
recoveries for plaintiff prisoners who have suffered mental or emotion injury to those
circumstances when they have also suffered physical injury); Human Rights Watch,
World Report 2001  United States (2001) [hereinafter World Report 2001] (arguing that
under the PLRA and its interpretations by the courts,  inmates cannot sue for
humiliation, mental torture or non-physical sadistic treatment by guards, unless, in
effect, they have broken bones or blood to show for it. ), available at
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/usa/index.html; see also OBryan, supra note 142, at 1211
(arguing there are many emotional results of sexual harassment that will not be
redressable as a result of the physical injury requirement).
149. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 642 ( The effect of sexual harassment
on women prisoners is profound. ).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 642-43.
152. See Bell, supra note 67, at 208 (discussing the suicides and attempted suicides
of female inmates sexually abused by their correctional officers).
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face as they see their harassers every day can be devastating.
However, the PLRA dictates that these women may receive nothing if
154
they cannot prove physical injury.
During the Congressional hearings regarding the PLRA speakers
made it clear that sexual abuse is often accompanied by intimidation
155
tactics by correctional officers, which make it even more difficult
156
How will female inmates
for inmates to get their abuse reported.
who are unable to even report sexual abuse capable of demonstrating
physical injury in a courtroom years later? As one inmate at C.T.F.
stated in 1994:  You know its wrong what the officer did; and he
knows its wrong. But youre not going to be able to prove it. The
officers always get the benefit of the doubt. 157 The PLRA leaves
female inmates who suffer the emotional effects of sexual abuse in
prison without a judicial remedy, and the officers still get the benefit
158
of the doubt.
III. R EMEDIES A VAILABLE IN THE DISTRICT OF C OLUMBIA :
LACK OF E NFORCEMENT
A. Section 24-211.02 of the District of Columbia Code
1.

The Judiciarys Interpretation of Section 24-211.02

Section 24-211.02 (formerly § 24-442) of the District of Columbia
Code outlines the responsibilities that the Department of Corrections

153. See id. at 208-09 (noting a case in Florida where an inmate hanged herself
 after writing to her sentencing judge and to her mother about sexual abuse by
prison guards ) (internal citations omitted).
154. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803(d), 110
Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (limiting
prisoner recovery for emotional injury to a showing of prior physical injury). See also
OBryan, supra note 142, at 1215 ( [T]he most obvious reading of the [PLRA] . . . is
that it creates an outright ban on all state and federal prisoners suits for mental and
emotional distress. ).
155. See Prisoners Rights Legislation, supra note 67 (relating that correctional
officers in Georgia intimidated female inmates who came forward about sexual
abuse, and officers who learned of abuse kept silent).
156. See Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 439 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(explaining that Daskalea was immediately placed in solitary confinement after
reporting the nude dancing incident to prison officials).
157. Lezin, supra note 5, at 200-01 (quoting an interview with a C.T.F. inmate in
February 1994).
158. Cf. OBryan, supra note 142, at 1212 ( Depending on how narrowly courts
interpret the physical injury requirement, [the PLRA] may inadequately protect
against violations of prisoners constitutional rights that involve physical invasions or
symptoms but do not rise to the level of injury. ).
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This
shall have for maintaining the well being of its inmates.
section of the D.C. Code states that the Department of Corrections
shall  be responsible for the safekeeping, care, protection,
instruction and discipline for all persons committed to such
160
institutions.
The statute has been interpreted by the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals as imposing a  duty to exercise reasonable care in the
protection and safekeeping of prisoners. 161 However, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals has also noted several times that this
statute does not make prison personnel  the insurers of an inmates
162
safety.
Therefore, an inmate who wishes to receive redress under
section 24-211.02 must demonstrate negligence on the part of the
163
District through common law tort proceedings.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has articulated a threeprong test which must be satisfied in order for an inmate to
164
demonstrate negligence under section 24-211.02. Accordingly, the
prisoner bears the burden of proving  the applicable standard of
care, a deviation from that standard, and a causal relationship
165
between that deviation and the plaintiffs injury.
This standard
places the burden on the inmate to bring forward expert testimony to
demonstrate that the District has violated an accepted standard of
166
care before she may prevail.
2.

Section 24-211.02 and Sexual Abuse of Female Inmates

Although it appears to be a clear and applicable standard, section
24-211.02 does little to help female inmates who have been sexually

159. D.C. C ODE A NN. § 24-211.02 (2001) (formerly D.C. C ODE A NN. § 24-442
(1981)). Section 24-211.02 was updated December 31, 2000. All cases in this
comment refer to the 1981 version of the bill.
160. Id.
161. Hughes v. District of Columbia, 425 A.2d 1299, 1302 (D.C. 1981).
162. See id. (citing Matthews v. District of Columbia, 387 A.2d 731 (D.C. 1978)).
Accord Herbert v. District of Columbia, 716 A.2d 196, 199 (D.C. 1998) (citing the
language of Hughes to reiterate that corrections officials are not insurers of the safety
of inmates under section 24-442).
163. See Phillips v. District of Columbia, 714 A.2d 768, 772-73 (D.C. 1998) (noting
that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof in a section 24-442 action and must
demonstrate that the negligence of the District proximately caused the harm to the
plaintiff).
164. See id. at 773.
165. See id. (citing Clark v. District of Columbia, 708 A.2d 632, 634 (D.C. 1997)).
166. See Hughes, 425 A.2d at 1303 (stating an inmate  must show by competent
expert testimony . . . a negligent deviation from the demonstrated acceptable
standard, if she is to prevail under section 24-442).
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167

Sexually abused female inmates can seek monetary relief
abused.
168
under section 24-211.02, but this relief does little to deter future
169
sexual assaults from occurring in D.C. prisons.
However, as the
D.C. Circuit explained in Women Prisons of the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections v. District of Columbia ( Women Prisoners II ),
170
section 24-211.02 does not seem to dictate injunctive relief.
In Women Prisoners II, the appellate court refused to apply
injunctive relief to the female inmate class regarding poor medical
care, because the court regarded injunctive relief as a  final resort
171
only to be used  when plaintiffs legal remedies are inadequate.
Because local District of Columbia courts had not applied section 24211.02 as an injunctive tool, the circuit court saw section 24-211.02s
application to inmates seeking injunctive relief as an  unsettled area
172
of local law.
Therefore, it refused to use section 24-211.02 to
173
validate the injunctions imposed by the lower court.
Although the language in Women Prisoners II regarding section 24211.02 was used by the D.C. Circuit Court when analyzing the
inadequate medical treatment and unreasonable conditions
174
presented by the class, the court also remained dedicated to
preserving local authority when it analyzed the sexual abuse that
175
occurred in Women Prisoners II.
With regard to sexual abuse, the
District of Columbia  conceded that it had failed to protect female
inmates from sexual abuse, and thereby admitted that it had

167. Cf. Day, supra note 61, at 585 (discussing the decision of the circuit court in
Women Prisoners II, which found the injunctive relief ordered by the lower court to be
outside the scope of the federal courts authority).
168. Cf. Women Prisoners II, 93 F.3d 910, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (denying injunctive
relief because local courts have never interpreted section 24-442 to include it).
169. See Day, supra note 61, at 585 (arguing injunctive relief is what most inmates
truly desire because it offers them a chance to alleviate the harmful conditions they
live in).
170. Women Prisoners II, 93 F.3d at 922 (noting that it was significant that there
have been no cases in the District of Columbia that have used section 24-442 to apply
injunctive relief to injured prisoners).
171. See id. at 921-22.
172. See id. at 922 ( [I]n a completely unsettled area of local law a federal District
Court opinion is no substitute for an authoritative decision by the courts of the
District of Columbia. ).
173. See id.
174. See id. at 923 (vacating all injunctive portions of the district court order
pertaining to medical facilities and treatment, and general conditions in the D.C.
prisons).
175. See Women Prisoners II, 93 F.3d at 930 (vacating portions of the District Court
order relating to the Special Officer for sexual misconduct, on the basis that it
 effectively usurps the executive functions of the District ).
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However, the appellate
violated their Eighth Amendment rights.
court went on to invalidate several of the most important injunctive
remedies provided by the district court based on the same
177
preservation of local authority that it read into section 24-211.02.
Among those vacated, the appellate court struck the paragraphs of
the district court order that allowed the Special Officer appointed by
the district court to monitor sexual abuse in the Districts
178
correctional facilities as  an unwarranted intrusion on local
179
government.
The D.C. Circuit Court has previously noted that  a
federal court may not shave the requirements of the Constitution to
180
In light of Women Prisoners II,
fit the desires of local officials.
however, it seems that the court may ignore constitutional rights on
the basis of local intrusion.
Given the interpretation that the appellate court gave section 24211.02 in Women Prisoners II, female inmates are not likely to be able
to use it as an injunctive remedy until local authorities analyze the
181
Without the ability to use section 24-211.02 to preserve
issue.
injunctions against the Department of Corrections, it is difficult to
determine how this statute can help female inmates who are sexually
182
abused in prison, or act to prevent such abuse.
B. District of Columbia Department of Corrections
Sexual Misconduct Policy
1.

Language of the Policy

When Women Prisoners I was litigated in 1994, the Department of
Corrections had no sexual misconduct policy and no investigation
procedures.183 As a result of Women Prisoners I, in March 1995 the
176. See id. at 930-31.
177. See id. at 932 (vacating all parts of the order regarding the monitoring of the
prisons by a Special Officer).
178. See id. at 933 app. A. The Special Officer was to monitor allegations of sexual
harassment, investigate outstanding cases, keep records of allegations, and notify
local law enforcement of sexual abuse. See id.
179. See id. at 932.
180. Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
181. Cf. Day, supra note 61, at 584 ( Common sense tells one that asking the
problem-maker [the Department of Corrections] to solve the problems will probably
not result in the most positive and productive solutions. ).
182. See id. at 585 ( Injunctive relief is often what the female inmates desire. ).
183. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. 634, 641 (D.D.C. 1994), revd in part and
affd in part, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that the Department did not
adequately investigate incidents of sexual misconduct because it had no policy and
did not take such incidences seriously).
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184

Department of Corrections issued its first sexual harassment policy,
which was soon updated to Department Order 3350.2A ( Order
3350.2A or  1995 Order ). Order 3350.2A outlined a policy against
185
sexual misconduct towards inmates. Its purpose was to establish a
procedure for dealing with sexual misconduct and to discourage such
186
Similar to the
misconduct within the Department of Corrections.
187
version which is still in effect as of the writing of this comment,
Order 3350.2A defines sexual misconduct as  sexual behavior which
is directed toward inmates under the purview of the DCDC [D.C.
188
Department of Corrections].
Additionally, sexual harassment is
identified and defined by Order 3350.2A as anything from  making
189
sexually offensive comments, to  creating an intimidating, hostile
190
or offensive environment.
More important than its definitions of sexual misconduct, Order
3350.2A established sexual misconduct complaint procedures for
191
both female and male inmates, as well as penalties for employees
192
who are found to have committed sexual misconduct.
The
procedures for reporting sexual misconduct begin with a confidential

184. See Women in Prison, supra note 35, at 13 (reporting that the 1995 policy was
the Departments initial effort toward a sexual misconduct policy).
185. See DEPT OF C ORRECTIONS, DISTRICT OF C OLUMBIA, DEPT O RDER NO . 3350.2A,
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT A GAINST INMATES (May 15, 1995) [hereinafter SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT A GAINST INMATES 1995] (on file with author).
186. See id. at pt. I ( The purpose of this directive is to establish . . . policy
regarding sexual misconduct against inmates; to discourage and prevent sexual
misconduct against inmates; and, to establish uniform procedures for reporting,
investigating, and adjudicating incidents of sexual misconduct in the [D.C.
Department of Corrections]. ).
187. See DEPT OF C ORRECTIONS, DISTRICT OF C OLUMBIA, DEPT O RDER NO . 3350.2C,
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT A GAINST INMATES, pt. VII(G)-(H) (Dec. 10, 1998) [hereinafter
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT A GAINST INMATES 1998] (on file with author). This order
updates the sexual misconduct policy of the Department of Corrections to include
more detailed guidelines for the handling of sexual misconduct complaints,
including investigation procedures. See id.
188. SEXUAL MISCONDUCT A GAINST INMATES 1995, supra note 185, at pt. VI(E).
Order 3350.2A further explains that no employee of the Department of Corrections
may exhibit inappropriate behavior, and that sexual contact between an inmate and
employee is sexual misconduct even if the inmate consents. See id.
189. Id. at pt. VI(E)(3)(a).
190. Id. at pt. VI(E)(3)(c).
191. See id. at pt. VII(B)-(C) (dividing investigations of sexual misconduct into
categories for male and female inmates, and establishing more detailed procedures
for female complainants).
192. See SEXUAL MISCONDUCT A GAINST INMATES 1995, supra note 185, at pt. VII(G)
and attach. 1. Penalties in the 1995 Order range from reprimand for the first sexual
harassment offense, to termination for the first sexual abuse offense. See id. at attach.
1. The penalties for retaliation against inmates who report sexual misconduct can
range from a fifteen-day suspension to termination. See id.
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report of the sexual misconduct, and continue by allowing the
inmate to file a written complaint directly with the Warden or by
194
using the internal grievance procedures of the prison. Once sexual
misconduct is reported, the 1995 Order outlines the mandatory
195
investigation procedures and disciplinary actions that may be taken
196
against Department of Corrections employees.
In addition, the most recently updated version of the Department
197
of Corrections Order incorporates the criminal law of the District
198
of Columbia into the policy. The December 1998 version includes
199
all sexual abuse offenses as defined by the D.C. Code. It includes
any sexual abuse ranging from first degree sexual abuse, defined as a
200
sexual act committed on another person by force or threat of force,
to misdemeanor sexual abuse, defined as commission of a sexual act
201
or contact without the other persons permission.
2.

Application of the Sexual Misconduct Policy

Though the procedures outlined in the 1995 Order set up
202
203
204
reporting, investigative, and disciplinary channels for female
193. See id. at pt. VII(B)(1) ( A female inmate may make a confidential report of
sexual misconduct through the established twenty-four hour (24) telephone hotline.
The telephone hotline shall be supervised by the Monitor [appointed by the District
Court in Women Prisoners I]. ).
194. See id. at pt. VII(B)(3) (noting that an inmate was able to advise the Warden
of the misconduct by writing him or her a letter or using inmate grievance
procedures outlined in Department Order No. 4030.1D).
195. See SEXUAL MISCONDUCT A GAINST INMATES 1995, supra note 185, at pt.
VII(B)(7)(a) (indicating the duties of the court-appointed monitor to report
misconduct allegations to the Executive Deputy Director and the affected Warden,
and to issue a report after investigating the incident).
196. See id. at pt. VII(F)(2)-(3) (describing disciplinary actions to be taken against
employees who fail to report misconduct and who commit sexual misconduct).
197. See generally SEXUAL MISCONDUCT A GAINST INMATES 1998, supra note 187
(updating the 1995 sexual misconduct policies of the Department of Corrections on
December 10, 1998).
198. See id. at pt. VI(F)(1) ( Sexual Abuse is defined as: a) forced or coerced
sexual act or sexual contact, as defined by former D.C. Code sections 22-4101
through 22-4106 [now sections 22-3002 through 22-3006]. ).
199. See D.C. CODE A NN. § 22-3002 to 3006 (2001). The sections of the D.C. Code
referenced by the 1998 Order define and describe the penalties for first, second,
third, and fourth-degree sexual abuse, as well as misdemeanor sexual abuse. See id.
200. See D.C. CODE A NN. § 22-3002 (2001) (original version at § 22-4102 (1981)).
201. See D.C. CODE A NN. § 22-3006 (2001) (original version at § 22-4106 (1981)).
202. See SEXUAL MISCONDUCT A GAINST INMATES 1995, supra note 185, at pt.
VII(B)(1)-(4) (outlining the procedures for inmate reporting of sexual misconduct
by Department of Corrections employees, including a procedure for confidential
reports); see also SEXUAL MISCONDUCT A GAINST INMATES 1998, supra note 187, at pt.
VII(D)-(E) (updating the sexual misconduct policy to include detailed reporting
procedures for employees who receive sexual misconduct complaints).
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inmates who are sexually abused in prison, it has continued to fail to
205
aid women who have been abused. The Department of Corrections
has notoriously had difficulty with employees following the directives
contained in Order 3350.2A, and consequently sexual misconduct
206
has not been curbed.
Perhaps the most chilling example of the failure of Department of
Corrections staff to follow the Sexual Misconduct policies is the case
of Sunday Daskalea.207 When Daskaleas case reached the circuit
court, the court noted that the 1995 Sexual Misconduct policy  was
208
The court also discussed the
never posted for the guards.
inadequate training and lack of corrective measures taken by the
209
Department of Corrections to implement the 1995 Order.
As a result of the poor administration of the policy, Sunday
Daskalea filed over fifteen internal grievance forms, wrote numerous
letters to Department of Corrections officials, and even wrote to the
judge handling her criminal matter in order to complain about
210
sexual harassment at the D.C. Jail  all without any response.
The failure of the Department of Corrections to investigate these
complaints came to a pinnacle after Daskalea was forced to
211
participate in the nude dancing episodes in July of 1995.
203. See SEXUAL MISCONDUCT A GAINST INMATES 1995, supra note 185, at pt.
VII(B)(7) (placing investigative responsibilities on a Monitor who must complete a
detailed report wihtin thirty days); see also SEXUAL MISCONDUCT A GAINST INMATES
1998, supra note 187, at pt. VII(G)-(I) (altering investigative procedure to include;
interim procedures for during the investigation, investigation procedures conducted
by an investigator of the Department of Corrections, and post-investigation
procedures).
204. See SEXUAL MISCONDUCT A GAINST INMATES 1995, supra note 184, at pt. VII(G),
attach. 1 (describing penalties for correctional officers who have committed acts of
sexual misconduct against inmates).
205. See Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(citing trial testimony demonstrating that only some of the guards, and none of the
inmates, remembered receiving the sexual misconduct policy); Newby v. District of
Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 2d 35, 36 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding that other than issuing the
sexual misconduct policy, the District had done little to ensure supervision and
enforcement).
206. See Women in Prison, supra note 35, at 12 ( The District of Columbia
Department of Corrections has had long-standing problems involving allegations of
sexual misconduct by correctional staff. ). The GAO Report also noted there was a
policy in effect in 1995 when correctional officers forced female inmates to
participate in the  striptease shows at the D.C. Jail. See id. at 13.
207. See discussion supra Parts I.B and II.A.3 (describing Daskaleas case).
208. Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 437.
209. See id. ( There was no evidence that the training requirements were
implemented nor that any significant corrective intervention occurred [after the first
Sexual Misconduct Order was issued]. ).
210. See id. at 438 (detailing Daskaleas complaints to authorities).
211. See id. (describing the sexual harassment and assault that Daskalea endured
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Subsequent to the incident, Daskalea discussed the forced nude
dancing with a Department of Corrections official, and expressed
concern about retaliation from guards if she spoke up about the
212
Daskaleas concerns were confirmed the day after her
incident.
complaint when she was placed in solitary confinement as
213
She was forced to remain in solitary even when
retaliation.
committee members appointed to investigate the nude dancing
214
incident attempted to interview her.
The story of Sunday Daskalea is only one example of the inability
of the Department of Corrections to effectively use its sexual
misconduct policy to investigate and eradicate sexual misconduct in
the D.C. Prisons.215 Although the policy and its progeny appear to
create an effective system for curbing misconduct, the courts have
216
The Department of
noted that this is simply not the case.
Corrections sexual misconduct policy is the only remedy available for
217
female inmates that does not involve litigation and offers an actual
change in the environment sexually abused women live under
218
219
through the discipline and removal of violating officers.
Thus,
the sexual misconduct policy of the District is the only true remedy
for female inmates. However, without effective implementation and
enforcement of the policy itself, the D.C. Prisons will continue to be
220
plagued by sexual misconduct.
prior to the nude-dancing incident in July 1995).
212. See id. at 439 (relating Daskaleas meeting in the office of a Department of
Corrections official).
213. See Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 439 ( A lieutenant appeared, told Daskalea she was
going to solitary, and when she protested threatened to mace her. She was then
placed in solitary confinement, without any of her belongings and, at first, without a
mattress . . . . Daskaleas requests to call an attorney were refused. ).
214. See id. at 440 ( When the Makins Committee asked to speak with Daskalea in
early August  at which time she was being held in solitary confinement  it was
informed that she had already been discharged. ).
215. See Women in Prison, supra note 35, at 2 (noting that only twelve of the 111
sexual misconduct allegations in a two and a half year time period resulted in staff
resignations or disciplinary actions).
216. Cf. Newby v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 2d 35, 37 (D.D.C. 1999)
(reporting as of the date of the opinion, the District had not taken measures to
monitor what occurs in the jail despite its history of misconduct).
217. See discussion supra Parts I and II (describing the conditions in D.C. prisons
and the ineffective federal laws inmates must rely upon).
218. SEXUAL MISCONDUCT A GAINST INMATES 1995, supra note 185, at pt. VII(G)
(outlining the penalties to correctional officers for violating sexual misconduct
policies).
219. See id. at attach. 1 (describing the penalty for sexual assault or sexual abuse as
 termination ).
220. See Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(noting that some form of sexual misconduct  policy had been in effect since
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IV. R ECOMMENDATIONS FOR C HANGE
A. Enforcement Through Criminal Prosecution of Correctional Officers
When a woman is sexually assaulted in the District of Columbia,
she may rely upon local law enforcement to come to her aid and
hopefully to remove her attacker from the streets.221 A woman who is
incarcerated may not rely upon her local law enforcement in the
222
Female inmates should be afforded the same
same fashion.
protections from sexual abuse by the criminal justice system as
223
Criminal investigation and
women living outside of prison.
prosecution of correctional officers who commit sexual assaults is one
224
way to assure that protection.
Although forty-one states and the District of Columbia have laws
225
these laws are often
criminalizing sexual abuse of inmates,
226
In fact, in the past the District of Columbia
unenforced.
Department of Corrections has been known to simply transfer
correctional officers to new facilities when they are suspected of
227
sexual misconduct.
before Women Prisoners I, but it was found to be  of little value ). But see Women in
Prison, supra note 35, at 30 ( [T]he District of Columbia has one of the strictest and
most comprehensive sets of sexual abuse laws and policies in the country . . . . [It]
has been required by court order since December 1994 to take appropriate steps to
prevent and remedy staff sexual misconduct. ).
221. See D.C. CODE A NN. § 22-3002 to 3006 (2001) (defining sexual abuse in the
District of Columbia and its criminal penalties). Criminal penalties in the District
range from 180 days for a misdemeanor to life in prison for first-degree sexual abuse.
See id.
222. See, e.g., Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. 634, 642 (D.D.C. 1994), revd in part
and affd in part, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that the police failed to inform
one inmate who filed criminal charges of the status of their investigation and failed
to take disciplinary action against the officer who assaulted her).
223. See SEXUAL MISCONDUCT A GAINST INMATES 1998, supra note 187, at pt. VI(F)(1)
(referencing the D.C. Code provisions on sexual abuse in its definition of sexual
abuse).
224. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 641 (noting that officers accused or
suspected of sexual misconduct were simply transferred to other D.C. operated
facilities).
225. See Eun-Kyung Kim, Extent of Inmate Sex Abuse Unknown, A SSOC. PRESS O NLINE,
July 21, 1999, available at 1999 WL 22024831.
226. See World Report 2001, supra note 148 (relating that criminal prosecutions of
correctional officers from November 1999 to October 2000  was rare, and
convictions
in
such
cases
[were]
even
rarer ),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1; see also Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 642 (explaining
failure of D.C. police to inform female inmates of their investigations or to take
action against guards who attack female inmates). Contra WORLD R EPORT 2001, supra
note 148 (noting that although rare, criminal prosecutions of abusive correctional
staff were on the rise from 1999 to 2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1.
227. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 642 ( When the [Department of
Corrections] do[es] suspect that an employee is guilty of sexual misconduct . . . they
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Since December 1994, the Department of Corrections has been
required to:  (1) notify the Metropolitan Police Department about
any allegation involving unwelcome sexual intercourse or unwelcome
sexual touching, (2) communicate with the police department
concerning the status of any investigations of these allegations, and
(3) periodically document the status of police investigations. 228
However, in a study conducted by the General Accounting Office in
1999, it was noted that the  Department of Corrections did not have
any available information on the status of police investigations,
229
which were supposed to be ongoing.
In addition, the district court in Women Prisoners I noted that several
230
of the female inmates complaints had been reported to the police,
but these women had not been informed about the status of their
investigations nor had any corrective action been taken against the
231
guards involved. Similarly, the strip-tease incident, involving Newby
and Daskalea, resulted in the termination of four officers, the
232
suspension of six others, and the filing of four civil lawsuits. There
233
was, however, no criminal action taken against the officers.
This lack of enforcement by local police departments is not a
234
problem unique to the District of Columbia; it is a problem that is
235
endemic in our criminal justice system.
Female inmates, and inmates in general, are not believed by local
236
Additionally, sexual
law enforcement when they file complaints.
often simply reassign the employee to a different facility. ).
228. Women in Prison, supra note 35, at 15.
229. Id.
230. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 642.
231. See id.
232. See Women in Prison, supra note 35, at 13.
233. See id. (omitting any indication that criminal charges were brought against
any of the guards involved).
234. See, e.g., Emily Wilkerson, Corrections Director Disputes Sexual Misconduct Reports,
ST. J. R EG. (Springfield, IL), July 24, 1996, at 8 (noting the state corrections
spokesman remembered only one incident in which a correctional officer was
referred out for criminal prosecution, though over the prior ten years forty-five
employees had resigned or been discharged for  socializing with inmates ).
235. See Cruel and Unusual, WASH . POST, Apr. 23, 2001, at A14 ( [P]rosecutors
rarely bring charges for prison rapes. ); Bill Baskervill, Sexual Misconduct Charges
Common at Womens Prison, FORT WORTH STAR-T ELEGRAM, Oct. 17, 1999, at 8 (pointing
out that inmate sexual abuse complaints in Virginia are investigated and handled by
the prison system itself); Guard-Inmate Sex Should Be a Crime, NEWS T RIB. (Tacoma,
WA), Oct. 23, 1997, at A10 (arguing that guards should be subject to prosecution
and that the Washington legislature should pass laws making sex between inmates
and guards a felony); see also Steve Schmidt, Trial Shows Guard Unions Clout: Brutality
Allegations Difficult to Prove, SAN DIEGO UNION-T RIB., Nov. 11, 1999, at A3 (asking, in a
correctional officer brutality case,  Who are you going to believe? ).
236. See Schmidt, supra note 235, at A3 (commenting that investigation and
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assault cases are difficult to prove when they occur outside the prison
setting; attempting to prove they occurred inside the prison setting is
237
However, criminal prosecution is the only
far more difficult.
remedy which removes correctional officers from the prisons, rather
238
than compensates abused inmates with monetary relief. Thus, it is
the only remedy that has the potential to change the sexually abusive
environment of the Districts prisons.
B. Assumptions Made by Hiring More Female Guards
Another solution that has been recommended and adopted by
some correctional systems is the removal of male guards from areas in
female inmates living quarters.239 Although on its face the removal of
male guards appears to be a viable solution to the crisis of sexual
abuse in prisons, the suggestion operates under a number of
assumptions that make it unlikely to significantly alter behavior inside
240
prisons.
The first major assumption made by this suggestion is one based on
gender stereotypes  that removal of male guards will cut down on
241
the sexual abuse of women. Recently, however, investigations have
prosecution of guard misconduct is an  uphill battle in California).
237. See Abuse is Abuse, Whether in Prison or Not, C HI. SUN-T IMES, Mar. 11, 1997, at 27
(explaining that guards often avoid prosecution by portraying their sexual
relationships with inmates as consensual).
238. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (providing that those who deprive a citizen of
their rights under color of law are liable to the injured person) (emphasis added);
Women Prisoners II, 93 F.3d at 923 (opining that D.C. C ODE A NN. § 24-442, currently
codified at § 24-211.02, does not include injunctive relief); Women in Prison, supra
note 35, at 15 (highlighting that the District of Columbia could not provide data
regarding the  number, nature, or outcome of staff misconduct allegations during
the four-year period, 1995-1998 ).
239. See Kuo, supra note 61, at B2 (discussing the recent decision by the New York
State Department of Correctional Services to ban male correctional officers from ten
separate posts inside the female living quarters of the Westchester County jail);
Amnesty Intl, Report 2000  United States of America (2000) (indicating that Amnesty
International  called for female inmates to be guarded only be female officers in
1999), available at http://www.amnesty.org; see also Iman R. Soliman, Male Officers in
Womens Prisons: The Need For Segregation of Officers in Certain Positions, 10 T EX. J.
WOMEN & L. 45, 68 (2000) (arguing that a reasonable solution to abuse in womens
prisons is to restrict male guards from certain positions).
240. See, e.g., Soliman, supra note 239, at 68 (maintaining that removal of male
guards from direct-contact positions in womens prisons will  protect . . . womens
safety and privacy . . . and increase the womens chances of rehabilitation ). But see
Teresa A. Miller, Sex Surveillance: Gender, Privacy & the Sexualization of Power in Prison,
10 GEO . MASON U. C IV. R TS. L.J. 291, 292 (2000) ( Judges ignore the realities of sex
and power behind bars. ). Miller argues that the traditional notions of gender are
not applicable in the complex system of sex and power behind prison walls. See id. at
294-95.
241. Cf. Kuo, supra note 61, at B2 (articulating the desire of prison officials to have
 guards of the same gender working in areas where inmates have an expectation of
some privacy, like shower rooms and sleeping areas ); Jo Becker, Female Prisoners
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242

begun of sexual abuse by female correctional officers. Though still a
taboo subject, female correctional officers are also involved in
243
In fact, one of the
incidents of sexual abuse of female inmates.
female guards involved in the episode at the D.C. Jail involving
Newby and Daskalea  exposed herself to Daskalea while telling her
244
how much she enjoyed the dance.
245
Correctional officers enjoy near total control over inmates, and
the judicial system has not yet recognized the  realities of sex and
246
Therefore, exclusively employing female
power behind bars.
correctional officers in the living areas of the female inmates does
247
not necessarily address the realities of sexual abuse in prison.
Similarly, the removal of male correctional officers from the female
inmate areas operates under another assumption  that there will be
enough female correctional officers employed to fill those
248
positions. It has been estimated that as many as seventy percent of
249
the guards in federal womens institutions are male. It was noted by
the Director of the Women in Prison Project in New York that
vigorous attempts to hire more female guards would be necessary if
the plan to remove male guards from specified areas within female
250
facilities is to be implemented.
Report Abuses, ST. PETERSBURG T IMES, Dec. 24, 1999, at 1B (describing a memo that
asked Florida prisons to try to  avoid putting male officers where they would see
undressed female inmates ).
242. See generally Miller, supra note 240, at 291 (discussing the assumptions made
by the judicial system regarding gender and its place within the prison setting).
243. See Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(dismissing the Districts argument that because the abuse involved female
correctional officers there could be no 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability).
244. See id. at 439.
245. See Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiar: Sexual Abuse of Women in U.S. State
Prisons (Dec. 1996) ( [M]ale officers . . . have used their near total authority to
provide or deny goods and privileges to female prisoners, to compel them to have
sex or, in other cases, to reward them for having done so. ), available at
http://www.hrw.org/summaries/S.US96d.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2001).
246. See Miller, supra note 240, at 292 (stating the intent of the article as a look
into the failure of judges to consider the realities of sex in prison and its impact on
cross-gender searches).
247. See Kuo, supra note 61, at B2 ( The fundamental question is whether the
officials train guards to have proper behavior, ensure proper behavior, and hold
guards accountable [for their] offense. ) (quoting Jamie Tellner, Assoc. Counsel,
Human Rights Watch); cf. Ronald G. Turner, Sex in Prison, 36 T ENN. B.J. 12, 28
(2000) (contending that the United States operates its correctional facilities under
the incorrect assumption that a prisoners sexual energy disappears after
incarceration).
248. See Becker, supra note 241, at 1B (explaining that more than half of the
officers guarding female inmates in Florida are male).
249. See Bell et al., supra note 67, at 203n.50 (internal citations omitted).
250. See Kuo, supra note 61, at B2 (quoting the Director of the New York State
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When analyzed, removing male guards from specific areas in
female housing units will not eradicate the sexual abuse of female
inmates.251 There is no guarantee that female officers can be
recruited in the numbers necessary to fill the positions in female
252
housing units, or that sexual abuse would decrease if enough
253
254
female officers were employed.
Sex is power in prison.
Both
male and female correctional officers may subject female inmates to
255
sexual abuse; prison administrators must realize that gender does
not necessarily dictate their actions.
C ONCLUSION
In 1993, women incarcerated in the District of Columbia came
forward to fight against an epidemic of sexual abuse in the Districts
correctional facilities.256
At that time there were no sexual
257
misconduct policies in place, and there were no boundaries to the
sexual exploitation of female inmates in which correctional officers
258
One administrator in 1993 stated,  [Y]ou just get this
took part.
sense that [sexual misconduct] has always happened and it is always
259
260
going to happen. Today, it does not have to.
This Comment has demonstrated that judicial remedies are lacking
Correctional Associations Women in Prison Project as indicating the state should
offer more  incentives and benefits to have female guards remain in female
housing facilities, and should make an effort to hire more female guards).
251. See id. at B2 (noting the importance of training to ensure proper behavior
and not simply removing male officers).
252. See Smith, supra note 2, at 95 (noting from 1994 to 1998, the D.C. Jail
operated with more than 100 guard vacancies); cf. Miller, supra note 240, at 296n.20
( The national average for female correctional officers in 1996 was 18% of all
correctional officers. ).
253. Cf. Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 439 (discussing the involvement of female officers in
the  strip-tease incident).
254. See Miller, supra note 240, at 291 (arguing the focus on constitutional privacy
issues in prison is misplaced because  sex, power and the sexualization of power
through sexual violence are the issues judges should analyze).
255. See discussion supra Part V.B (discussing female-on-female sexual abuse in
Daskalea).
256. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. 634, 639 (D.D.C. 1994) (describing the
 sexualized environment of the prisons), revd in part and affd in part, 93 F.3d 910
(D.C. Cir. 1996).
257. See Women in Prison, supra note 35, at 13 (noting the initial policy was
implemented in March 1995).
258. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 640-41 (describing the types of sexual
abuse committed by correctional officers, including rape, sodomy, and verbal and
physical harassment).
259. Id. at 639 (brackets in original).
260. Cf. Women in Prison, supra note 35, at 30 (indicating that the District has one
of the most comprehensive sexual misconduct policies in the country).
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for women who are sexually abused in prison. However, female
inmates in the District should not be left without redress. The
District of Columbia today has one of the  strictest and most
comprehensive sexual misconduct policies and set of sexual abuse
261
The current policy encompasses sexual
laws in the United States.
abuse as defined by the Districts criminal code and makes violators
262
susceptible to criminal penalties.
It offers sexually abused female
inmates a remedy that has the power to remove their attackers from
263
As demonstrated by this Comment,
the correctional setting.
however, female inmates can only utilize this power if the sexual
264
That enforcement must not only
misconduct policy is enforced.
come from the Department of Corrections, but from outside the
265
prison walls in local law enforcement.
Criminal prosecution of correctional officers who violate District of
Columbia sexual abuse laws removes the officer from the correctional
266
That criminal
setting and may deter other sexual abuse.
prosecution must be commenced, however, and not disregarded by
267
law enforcement because the victims are prisoners.
Together, the
268
sexual misconduct policy of the Department of Corrections and
criminal enforcement by local police, have the potential to
269
significantly aid female inmates who have been sexually abused.
However, without enforcement of the disciplinary and criminal
penalties available against correctional officers, female inmates will
261. See id. (describing the specifics of the Districts policy according to the
opinions of correctional experts).
262. See SEXUAL MISCONDUCT A GAINST INMATES 1998, supra note 187, at pt.
VI(F)(1) (defining  sexual abuse by using the D.C. Code sections, which define
criminal sexual abuse in the District).
263. See id. at attach. 1 (outlining the penalties for the varying degrees of sexual
misconduct, including suspension and termination).
264. Cf. Daskalea 227 F.3d at 442 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ( [A] paper policy cannot
insulate a municipality from liability. ).
265. See Women in Prison, supra note 35, at 15 (noting the District has been
required by Court order since 1994 to report allegations of sexual abuse to the
Metropolitan Police Department).
266. See D.C. CODE A NN. § 22-3002 (2001) (defining the penalty for criminal
sexual abuse in the District as up to life in prison first-degree sexual abuse).
267. See Lezin, supra note 5, at 200 ( You know its wrong . . . . But youre not
going to be able to prove it. ) (quoting an interview with an inmate in C.T.F. in
February 1994); cf. Women in Prison, supra note 35, at 15 (discussing the Districts
policy of notifying local police of all sexual abuse allegations, but noting that the
Department of Corrections had no information regarding the status of any police
investigation).
268. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1 (describing the language of the sexual
misconduct policy).
269. See discussion supra Part V.A (discussing the utility of criminal penalties for
correctional officers who sexually abuse female inmates).
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continue to suffer at the hands of the District of Columbia.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2002

35

